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The security of quantum communication using a weak coherent source requires an accurate knowl-
edge of the source’s mean photon number. Finite calibration precision or an active manipulation
by an attacker may cause the actual emitted photon number to deviate from the known value.
We model effects of this deviation on the security of three quantum communication protocols: the
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol without decoy states,
Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) QKD protocol, and a coin-tossing protocol. For QKD,
we model both a strong attack using technology possible in principle, and a realistic attack bounded
by today’s technology. To maintain the mean photon number in two-way systems, such as plug-
and-play and relativistic quantum cryptography schemes, bright pulse energy incoming from the
communication channel must be monitored. Implementation of a monitoring detector has largely
been ignored so far, except for ID Quantique’s commercial QKD system Clavis2. We scrutinize this
implementation for security problems, and show that designing a hack-proof pulse-energy-measuring
detector is far from trivial. Indeed the first implementation has three serious flaws confirmed exper-
imentally, each of which may be exploited in a cleverly constructed Trojan-horse attack. We discuss
requirements for a loophole-free implementation of the monitoring detector.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the proposal of the Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol [1], there has been much interest in the
feasibility of secure quantum key distribution (QKD). A
number of security proofs have been proposed [2–6] and
successful implementations were carried out [7–9]. How-
ever, device models used in the security proofs have often
differed from the properties and behavior of the actual
equipment, which opened exploitable security loopholes
[10–16]. Most successful attacks are followed by either
a physical countermeasure, a modified QKD protocol, or
a modified security proof incorporating the imperfection
of the device into the model [17, 18]. Thus, looking for
inconsistencies between the devices and their models in
the security proof has a high impact on the security ver-
ification of the QKD systems.
In previous studies of QKD employing weak coherent
pulses, Alice chose the optimum value of her mean pho-
ton number µ based on the line loss, to maximize the
secure key rate [5, 19–21]. However, in this work we
consider the case when the actual µ emitted by Alice is
larger than this optimum value without Alice knowing
this. This can happen because of an active manipulation
by Eve, or because Alice underestimates µ owing to a
finite precision of her calibration. We explore the bound
∗ ssajeed@uwaterloo.ca
on the information that Eve can gain by exploiting this.
We also pinpoint imperfections in an existing commercial
QKD system that allows Eve to actively change µ, before
we introduce the theory. However readers only interested
in the attack theory may now skip to Sec. IV.
This security issue and our theory is applicable to any
QKD scheme that uses weak coherent states. However
it is especially important for two-pass schemes. Two-
pass optical schemes have significant practical advantages
and are widely used today, e.g., in plug-and-play QKD
[22], relativistic quantum cryptography [23], coin-flipping
[24], and most recently to simplify implementation of a
measurement-device-independent QKD [25]. In any two-
pass scheme, it is necessary for security to monitor the
light coming to Alice from Bob (or to Alice and Bob from
Charlie, in case of the measurement-device-independent
QKD). Otherwise, Eve could substitute a brighter pulse
and check the reflected signal to estimate the bit value
sent by Alice [10, 11]. Implementation of the monitoring
detector has largely been ignored in experimental real-
izations so far. The first implementation has been done
in ID Quantique’s commercial QKD device Clavis2 [26],
which we describe in Sec. II. We then show in Sec. III that
the current implementation of the monitoring detector
is incapable of being perfectly secure. We demonstrate
three flaws in its electronic circuit and show experimen-
tally that each of these flaws can be exploited to compro-
mise the security. Theoretical modeling in Secs. IV and
V confirms that even a practical attack implementable
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Plug-and-play system, as implemented in Clavis2 [22, 26].
today would breach security of this implementation. We
develop a general theory of attacks that exploit a changed
µ. Section IV proposes both a strong attack that is pos-
sible in principle but not currently implementable, and
the practical attack that uses off-the-shelf components.
Section V plots performance of the attacks for a range
of system parameters. In Sec. VI, we discuss the ap-
plicability of our attacks to the case of practical quan-
tum coin-tossing. We discuss how to redesign the pulse-
energy-monitoring detector in a secure way in Sec. VII,
and conclude in Sec. VIII.
II. QKD SYSTEM UNDER TEST
A. Plug-and-play scheme
Most fiber-based implementations of QKD systems use
either photon polarization or phase encoding of the bit
values. However, keeping the polarization stable over
long distances in fiber is difficult due to fiber’s birefrin-
gence that effectively applies a random, time-varying uni-
tary transformation on the polarization state of the pho-
tons. To avoid this difficulty, a phase-based plug-and-
play QKD system was proposed [27]. As this scheme is
implemented in the Clavis2 system (Fig. 1), we will sum-
marize it here.
The pulses originate in Bob’s laser at a rate of 5 MHz
(one pulse every 200 ns) and, after passing through an
unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI), they go
into the quantum channel. For each pulse generated by
the laser there are two orthogonally polarized pulses in
the optical link with a delay of 50 ns, as the path dif-
ference between the two arms of Bob’s interferometer
is 10 m. The second pulse has lower energy than the
first pulse because it came through the longer arm con-
sisting of the phase modulator (in off state during the
first pass), which caused additional loss. At Alice, these
bright pulses encounter a 10:90 coupler C3. Only 10% of
the light is used for QKD while the rest is used for syn-
chronization and security purposes. Alice’s attenuator
VOA1 provides desired attenuation, her phase modula-
tor (PM) applies random phase φA(0,
pi
2 , pi,
3pi
2 ) on the
second pulse, and the Faraday mirror (FM) reflects both
pulses and rotates their polarization orthogonally. The
two pulses, having arrived at Bob, take the opposite arms
of the MZI than the ones they took before. The PM in
the long arm now applies a random phase φB (either
0 or pi2 ). As a result of the combination of FM and un-
balanced MZI, the two pulses have the same polarization,
path difference and arrive at Bob’s 50:50 beamsplitter
(BS) at the same time. Hence, the choice of the output
BS path depends only on their relative phase difference
(φ = φA − φB). Two detectors D0, D1 and a circula-
tor are used in the configuration shown in the Fig. 1 to
collect the light after the BS. If φ = 0 (φ = pi), the
pulses emerge at the same (different) path from which
they came, and are collected by D1 (D0). However, if
Alice and Bob choose different bases (such that φ = pi2
or 3pi2 ), then the photons are split with equal probability
between D0 and D1.
At the input of Alice, ≈ 90% of the incoming light
is split at C3 towards the continuous, sync and pulse-
energy-monitoring classical detectors (Fig. 1). A vari-
able attenuator VOA2 is intended to be used for comple-
menting the channel loss to provide a constant amount
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Optical pulses coming into Alice. (a) Trains of pulses (frames) generated by Bob. The frames
are generated every 1 ms, are 340µs long, and contain 1700 pulse pairs. (b) Beginning of the frame showing a
synchronization pattern. The synchronization circuit checks for this specific pattern in every frame. (c) Two pulses
per slot in the optical link. The energy of the first pulse is measured to be 150 fJ and the energy of the second
(‘calibrated signal pulse’) is measured to be 73 fJ.
of power to these detectors. In the rest of this section,
we elaborate some technical aspects of system operation
that the reader needs to know before we could explain
our hacking.
B. Synchronization
The synchronization of Alice’s clock to Bob’s clock is
provided by the sync detector (Fig. 1). The synchroniza-
tion is required for QKD, and must thus be maintained
under any successful attack. Pulses are coming from Bob
in packets called frames generated every 1 ms as shown
in Fig. 2a. Each frame is 340µs long and contains 1700
pulse pairs with 200 ns period. Each of the 200 ns inter-
vals containing one of these pulse pairs is called a slot.
In Clavis2, only the first 20 slots of each frame are used
for the synchronization of Alice’s clock, i.e., the timing of
Alice’s modulator to Bob’s laser modulator and detector.
If they are detected as expected, the particular frame
is considered to be synchronized. The synchronization
pulses are shown in Fig. 2b. In the beginning of each
frame, Bob first sends 16 pulses, then skips two pulses
(17th and 18th) intentionally, and then sends the rest of
the pulses of the frame. Alice’s synchronization detec-
tor checks for this pattern in the first 20 slots with an
avalanche photodiode receiver (Fujitsu FRM5W232BS).
Upon detection of the correct pattern, Alice’s electronics
clock is synchronised to the frame, and further signals
from the sync detector are disregarded. This synchro-
nization is done separately for each frame coming from
Bob.
As mentioned in Sec. II A, for each laser pulse gener-
ated per slot there are two signals in the optical link (see
Fig. 2c). The energy of the first pulse is measured to be
150 fJ while the energy of the calibrated signal pulse is
measured to be 73 fJ at the output of Bob (energy val-
ues in the rest of the paper were measured at the same
point; Alice–Bob line attenuation was close to 0 dB in
our tests). Note that, in Alice, as the random phase was
applied only at the second pulse, only this pulse contains
the quantum information and hence we will call it ‘cali-
brated signal pulse’ for the rest of the paper.
C. Countermeasure against Trojan-horse attack
In the absence of industry standards for QKD security
and prior secure implementations of the plug-and-play
scheme, ID Quantique had to blaze the trail and define
an internal standard for implementing and testing the
pulse-energy-monitoring detector. First, the implemen-
tation had to be compact and inexpensive in order to fit
into the rackmounted commercial system. Second, for
each system leaving the factory it was to be precisely
calibrated and tested against 0.1 dB (≈ 2%) increase in
an energy of a single individual pulse incoming to Alice,
the increase being applied on top of the normal pulse
sequence expected at Alice’s input. The monitoring de-
tector had to reliably raise alarm in this condition. The
testing equipment and software were developed at the
factory.
Further testing by an independent hacking team has
confirmed that the system passes this factory-defined
specification. However it has also revealed that the spec-
ification followed by ID Quantique is too weak and that
one can set up other classes of attacks that exploit over-
looked security flaws in the present countermeasure im-
plementation. This emphasises the need for open in-
dustrial standards and independent certification labs for
QKD implementation security.
D. Pulse energy monitoring
The pulse-energy-monitoring circuit is designed to in-
tegrate the incoming pulse energy and trigger an alarm
when the energy exceeds a predefined threshold value. A
fiber-pigtailed p-i-n photodiode (JDSU EPM 605LL) is
used to detect the light. Its photocurrent is processed
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(a) Simplified circuit diagram of the pulse-energy-monitoring detector. See text for details.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Pulse-energy-monitoring circuit and oscillograms. The six test points are marked ‘light’,
‘amplifier’, ‘reset’, ‘capacitor’, ‘comparator’ and ‘alarm’ in (a), and the oscillograms at these points are shown (b)
for normal operation and (c) for the case when light power is increased by 0.1 dB (i.e., by ≈ 2%) above normal
operation. During normal operation, when light pulses arrive with expected energy, the capacitor voltage always
stays over the threshold level Vth. However, when the pulse’s energy is higher than expected, due to higher gate
pulse to FET1, deeper discharge of the integrating capacitor results. This causes its voltage go below Vth, which in
turn creates an alarm.
by an electronic circuit shown in Fig. 3a. Signals at six
test points marked in the circuit are shown in Figs. 3b
and 3c. At the front-end of the circuit there is a two-
stage transimpedance amplifier, converting photocurrent
into voltage signal. Owing to insufficient bandwidth of
the amplifier first stage (opamp DA1; Texas Instruments
OPA380), it outputs slow-rising electrical pulses that ex-
tend to the next few bit slots and interfere with the sig-
nals from those slots. The amplifier’s second stage is a
wideband current-feedback opamp DA2 (Analog Devices
50
100
200
300
Li
gh
t(
RW
)
0 100 200 300 400
0
1
2
Am
pl
if
ie
r(
V)
time (Rs)
(a)
0
100
200
300
0 2 4 6
0
1
2
time ( s)
(b)
0
100
200
300
118 120 122 124 126 128
0.75
1.25
time (Rs)
(c)
FIG. 4: (Color online) Recovery of the front-end amplifier from the negative saturation to the normal operation. (a)
Entire 340µs long frame. A minor peak is visible in the amplifier output at ∼ 123µs, marking the recovery of the
amplifier from the negative saturation. (b) Initial part of the recovery from the negative saturation. Even though
light pulses are arriving at the input of the amplifier, no output is produced for ∼ 3µs. (c) A transient at ∼ 123µs
is the last irregularity, after which the amplifier fully recovers from the saturation.
AD8009) that does not further distort the signal. Its
output acts as a gate pulse for an N-channel field-effect
transistor FET1 that is a part of an integrator circuit.
In theory, the operation of the integrator circuit should
be the following. The gate pulse for FET2 (reset signal)
is applied by the field-programmable-gate-array (FPGA)
system controller. This reset signal is normally high,
keeping FET2 in a conductive state such that current
flows through it to an integrating capacitor C. At time t1,
the reset signal switches FET2 into high-impedance state
for 50 ns, and the capacitor starts to discharge through
FET1 (see capacitor signal). The amount of discharge is
higher when the power of incoming light is higher. At
time t2, reset signal switches FET2 into conductive state
again and stops the discharging. This happens in each bit
slot, and a negative spike proportional to the incoming
light energy is generated at the capacitor. The negative
spike is compared to a predefined threshold level Vth,
whose value is calibrated at the factory in such a way
that during normal operation, the negative spike ampli-
tude is very close but almost never goes below Vth. How-
ever, when there is an extra light, this voltage crosses the
threshold causing the output of comparator DA3 to go
low.
In actual operation of the practical implementation,
when the reset signal from the FPGA goes into the nor-
mal high state while the amplifier output is high, both
FET1 and FET2 are in the conductive state simultane-
ously. Instead of charging the capacitor, current from
the +3.3 V supply flows through both of them into the
ground. As a result, the integrating capacitor cannot be
charged instantly by the reset signal. This produces the
capacitor signal seen on the oscillogram that does not
quite match the expected ideal circuit behavior. Nev-
ertheless, the capacitor signal’s lowest level during the
cycle strongly depends on the light energy, allowing the
circuit to detect a small excessive amount of light in a
single pulse when tested to ID Quantique’s specification.
The comparator signal is fed to a pulse generator that
produces fixed-width pulse on the low-to-high logic level
transition. This is the alarm signal fed to the FPGA
that indicates the excess of incoming light. The system
software discards all detections in the frame if one or
more pulses inside the frame have triggered alarm in Al-
ice. Thus any attempt by Eve to inject brighter pulses
in a frame should lead to that frame being dropped from
QKD.
E. Frame structure
As explained in Sec. II B, the first 20 slots in each
frame bear the synchronization pattern. However, data-
carrying pulses (which we will henceforth call data pulses)
start from slot 701 (140µs) and continue to the last slot
1700 (340µs) of the frame. The slots 21 to 700 are idle.
The latter is a work-around for an engineering mistake:
The output of opamp DA1 enters negative saturation
when there is no light coming in [28]. Once pulses appear,
recovery from this saturation state takes a relatively long
time, approximately 123µs or 615 slots, with a bump at
the end of the recovery (see Fig. 4). Pulse energy alarm
signal is only monitored during the data pulses (slots
701–1700) [29].
F. Continuous detector
The continuous detector in Fig. 1 is low-bandwidth (of
the order of 20 kHz) and is not designed to monitor Bob’s
individual pulses. The purpose of this detector is to au-
tomate the measurement of the line loss at the time of
6system installation. In addition, this detector may be
used for detection of continuous-wave light injected dur-
ing the Trojan-horse attack, however this functionality
has not been implemented and we have not tested it.
III. HACKING
A general idea of the Trojan-horse attack is that Eve
replaces at least some of the data pulses coming from Bob
to Alice with brighter ones. These pulses will come out
of Alice with proportionally higher mean photon number
µ, allowing Eve to exploit their multi-photon statistics
to learn more information than expected by Alice and
Bob (as will be detailed in Sec. IV). It suffices for Eve
to inject only a few bright pulses per frame, because she
can exploit these and block all the other Alice’s pulses
from reaching Bob.
For a successful attack, Eve must satisfy the follow-
ing requirements: she must not break the synchroniza-
tion between Alice and Bob, she must not trigger any
alarm, and she must not alter Bob’s original detection
rate. The total energy of the frame was not monitored
in Clavis2 for security (although we also matched it in
some of our attacks). To keep the synchronization, we
generate pulses in the first 20 slots as expected by the
sync detector (see section II B). Since in each frame, no
monitoring is performed prior to 140µs (700 pulses; see
section II E), we are free to generate pulses with any en-
ergy till this time to adjust the energy of the whole frame.
After pulse energy monitoring begins at 140µs, injecting
extra light should trigger an alarm. However, in this
section we show three different approaches allowing Eve
to inject extra light into at least some calibrated signal
pulses without triggering the alarm.
A. Exploiting low bandwidth of front-end amplifier
The 3 dB bandwidth of the front-end amplifier in the
current configuration is about 1 MHz [28], which causes
it to output slowly rising electrical pulses (as mentioned
in Sec. II D). This opens up a loophole which we have
experimentally exploited to break the security. We be-
gan by redistributing energy between the two pulses of a
pair incoming to Alice (shown in Fig. 2c). We suppressed
the first pulse and made the second pulse proportionally
brighter. Since only the second pulse is modulated in
Alice, only its photon number µ is significant for the se-
curity [30]. However because of the slow response of the
front-end amplifier, responses to the two pulses largely
overlap at the amplifier output. The electronics is thus
mainly monitoring the total energy of the pulse pair and
not the second pulse. By this method we obtained second
pulse energy increase over the calibrated value by a mul-
tiplication factor x = 3.1, without triggering an alarm.
This would break security in theory, but is only sufficient
for a partial information leak of 49% with BB84 protocol
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Exploiting the low bandwidth of
the front-end amplifier to break the security.
(80% with Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04)
protocol) when using an attack implementable with to-
day’s technology (analysed in Secs. IV and V). To in-
crease x further, we then started to suppress additional
pulses.
For every four pulses, we suppressed the first three and
injected at the fourth slot a bright pulse which we call
the ‘probe pulse’ (see Fig. 5). Due to the three blocked
pulses, the voltage level at the output of the front-end
amplifier is most of the time lower than normal (com-
pare Fig. 5a with Fig. 3b). When the much brighter
probe pulse arrives at the fourth slot, it does not in-
crease the voltage enough to trigger the alarm. In our
experiment we were able to inject a probe pulse with a
maximum energy of 623 fJ (shown in Fig. 5b), which is
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Energy multiplication factor x
for (n+ 1)st pulse vs. number of blocked pulses n, in
the amplifier saturation attack.
approximately 8.5 times more than the calibrated signal
pulse energy (73 fJ).
We also experimentally performed blocking two out of
three and one out of two pulses and were able to inject a
probe pulse with 7.3 and 5.4 times more energy respec-
tively. We could block more than three pulses but in that
case the negative saturation of the amplifier became the
dominant factor, as discussed and generalized in the next
subsection.
B. Exploiting saturation of front-end amplifier
As mentioned in section II E, data pulses are sent only
after 140µs from the start of the frame because the front-
end amplifier takes time to recover from the negative
saturation. We removed all the pulses from 100µs till
the start of the monitoring period (140µs), which forced
the amplifier to re-enter the negative saturation. Then,
starting at 140µs, for every n+ 1 pulses, we blocked the
first n pulses and sent a bright probe pulse at (n + 1)st
slot. We continued to increase the energy of this probe
pulse until an alarm was generated. The multiplication
factor achieved versus n is plotted in Fig. 6. We see
that the curve rises steeply for up to 100 pulses blocked,
then starts to saturate. By blocking 250 pulses, Eve can
achieve multiplication factor x = 31.5, while by block-
ing 100 pulses she can have x = 30.4. Thus, to avoid a
reduction of the key rate under attack, it is likely more
efficient to block 100 or fewer pulses.
As an example, we show the 100 pulse blocking case
in Fig. 7. Starting from 100µs into the frame, we began
blocking 100 pulses and sending a bright probe pulse at
each 101st slot. The signal at the amplifier output be-
came smaller as we went further into the frame, vanishing
in the last part of it. This is because the longer the am-
plifier stayed into saturation, the more energy it needed
to recover. While we have entered 9 probe pulses each
with 2220 fJ energy (x = 30.4), no alarm was generated
during the 140–340µs monitoring period.
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Attack exploiting the saturation
effect of the front-end amplifier, blocking 100 pulses.
The further into the frame the probe pulses are injected,
the smaller the amplifier output becomes, because the
amplifier stays into saturation for a longer period and
more energy is required to bring it out of it. In the
alarm plot, the first three pulses occurred because the
energy of the probe (light) pulses was enough to
produce an amplifier output strong enough to result in
an alarm (as it has not yet been into a deep saturation).
However, they occurred before the monitoring period
and were not counted as an alarm signal by the FPGA.
Similarly, the last pulse in the alarm plot occurred when
the integrator was reset after the frame (after the end of
monitoring period) and was not counted as an alarm.
The reduced pulse rate by itself is not a problem (the
maximum number of possible detections in Clavis2 is 19
per frame owing to the 10µs deadtime introduced after
each detection [31]). However, the attack model in Sec. V
shows that suppression of more pulses requires a higher
multiplication factor x to maintain the count rate at Bob,
causing the attack to become more difficult for Eve.
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(a) Injection of very bright pulses and their effect on the
circuit. Note that at the end of the frame when the amplifier
output became zero, the capacitor voltage was still low. The
reason is because after the end of the frame, the FPGA no
longer generated the reset signal and hence the integrator
did not reset. It reset at the beginning of the next frame
after the reset signal was produced.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Exploiting edge-triggered alarm
monitoring.
C. Exploiting edge-triggered alert monitoring
As mentioned in Sec. II D, the output from the com-
parator is applied to a pulse generator that produces a
fixed-width alarm pulse on the low-to-high transition of
its input. In addition, the integrator is unable to reset the
capacitor voltage if the amplifier output is high. These
particular design choices pose the biggest loophole in the
system, which we have confirmed experimentally. Before
the start of the monitoring period, at around 100µs, we
started injecting bright probe pulses at each slot in or-
der to push the capacitor voltage completely below the
threshold (Fig. 8). As long as the bright pulses were sent
(in our case until the end of the frame), the comparator
output remained low and there was no low-to-high tran-
sition for the pulse generator to produce the alarm. After
the end of the frame, when we stopped sending the bright
pulses, the amplifier output went low as seen from Fig. 8a
but the capacitor voltage was still below the threshold as
there was no reset signal to reset the integrator at the
end of the frame. Using this method, we were able to
inject probe pulses with a maximum energy of 7150 fJ
(limited by our available source power) corresponding to
a multiplication factor x = 97 (Fig. 8b). Note that the
attack takes place in every bit slot, and no pulses needed
to be blocked. Intuitively, at such a high µ this attack
shifts Alice’s operation close to a classical regime, and no
security can be maintained.
IV. THEORY OF ATTACKS
Clavis2 implements two QKD protocols: non-decoy
BB84 and SARG04. In this section we consider BB84,
while SARG04 is introduced in Sec. V B. The amount of
privacy amplification used by Clavis2 to ensure security
is based on a strong attack that combines two attacks:
photon-number-splitting (PNS) and cloning [32]. With
these attacks, the mutual information between Alice and
Eve becomes [33]
IA:E =
1
2
µη(ttb − µ
2
)I1(D1) +
1
2
µη
µ
2
, (1)
where µ is the average photon number per pulse set by
Alice, η is Bob’s average detector efficiency, t is the mea-
sured channel transmission efficiency, tb is the transmis-
sion in Bob’s interferometer, and I1(D1) is the informa-
tion gathered by Eve when she performed cloning at-
tack that introduces a disturbance D1 on the state. The
first term in the equation comes from the cloning attack,
where Eve obtains partial information, and the second
term comes from the PNS attack which gives Eve full
information. To maintain security, the information gath-
ered by Eve must be removed from the final key:
S = IA:B − IA:E , (2)
with IA:B (the mutual information between Alice and
Bob) defined as [33]:
IA:B =
1
2
[µttbη + 2pd][1− fecH(Q)]. (3)
Here, pd is Bob’s detector dark count probability, fec
is the error correction efficiency, H is the binary en-
tropy function, and Q is the measured QBER. The term
fecH(Q) accounts for the information revealed during er-
ror correction, which must be discarded.
9The above security analysis makes three basic assump-
tions. The first is that Eve has no control over Bob’s
detectors (η and pd cannot be changed). The second is
that Bob expects a certain count rate and Eve should not
change it. The last assumption is that Eve performs in-
dividual attacks. In addition, the analysis ignores multi-
photon events above two photons by assuming they occur
too infrequently to contribute significantly. Our attack,
considered below, follows these three assumptions but in-
cludes multi-photon events which become significant as
µ is increased. We also assume that Bob does not moni-
tor double clicks, and instead implements the squashing
model [34] (implemented by ID Quantique in a recent
software update to Clavis2), where double clicks are as-
signed a random bit value, therefore contributing to an
average 50% QBER.
We consider two attacks. The first is a strong attack
which is limited by the laws of quantum mechanics only.
The second attack is a realistic attack that is limited by
the present-day technology.
A. Strong attack
We model our strong attack as the same combined PNS
and cloning attacks assumed by Clavis2 [33], but with µ
being manipulated and increased by a factor x so that the
multi-photon components can no longer be ignored. The
mutual information between Alice and Eve then becomes:
I ′A:E = R1I1(D1) +Rmulti. (4)
Here R1 (Rmulti) is the contribution to Bob’s detection
rate from the single-photon (multi-photon) pulses where
Eve implements the cloning (PNS) attack.
R1 =
1
2
p1attackηxµe
−xµ (5)
Rmulti =
1
2
∞∑
n=2
pnattack[1− (1− η)n−1]
(xµ)n
n!
e−xµ, (6)
with pnattack the probability of performing the attack on
the n-photon pulse. In cases where Eve doesn’t attack
on a pulse, this pulse is blocked by her and does not con-
tribute to Bob’s detection rates. To ensure the expected
count rate at Bob remains unchanged, the rates must
follow
R1 +Rmulti =
1
2
[1−
∞∑
n=1
((1− ttbη)n)µ
n
n!
e−µ]. (7)
When x is small, pnattack is always 1 for n ≥ 2. As
x increases, the probability of cloning attacks (p1attack)
decreases. If x is large enough for Eq. (7) to be satisfied
with p1attack = 0, Eve stops performing cloning attacks
and begins blocking the pulses with lower photon number
to satisfy Eq. (7), i.e., first p2attack is reduced, then p
3
attack
and so on until the equation is satisfied.
SW1 SW2
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Eve Eve
Bob΄
basis 1
Bob΄
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USD
attack
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attack
FIG. 9: (Color online) Realistic attack scheme. With a
probability pUSDattack, pulses from Alice are measured by
Eve using a 50:50 beamsplitter followed by two copies of
Bob’s setup Bob′ that use different measurement bases.
When the USD measurement is successful, Eve sends a
pulse in the measured state using a source Alice′ placed
next to Bob. SW1 and SW2 are optical switches. SW2
can in practice be replaced by an asymmetric
beamsplitter.
B. Realistic attack
Eve’s realistic attack is limited by current technologies.
In a realistic attack, Eve cannot alter the transmission of
the channel, the alignment of the system or characteris-
tics of Bob’s detectors. In addition, she must use realistic
beamsplitters and optical switches that have non-zero in-
sertion loss.
Eve’s realistic attack strategy is to implement an un-
ambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [35] with
a certain probability pUSDattack while doing nothing with a
probability (1 − pUSDattack). We also analysed the beam-
splitting attack strategy [7, 36], but it performed signifi-
cantly worse than the USD attack. Hence we only present
here the results from the USD attack. In addition, the
USD attack has the advantage of producing no extra er-
rors (which could be monitored and used to detect Eve).
Eve’s measurement apparatus, shown in Fig. 9, con-
sists of a 50:50 beamsplitter followed by two receiver
units Bob′ (one for each measurement basis) with two
detectors each. We assume Eve is placed immediately
outside Alice’s system (before any transmission losses in
the fiber) as this gives Eve the maximum detection prob-
abilities. Eve also has a source Alice′, placed just be-
fore Bob. This source emits attenuated-laser quantum
states with an average photon number µe. Using this
source, Eve sends a pulse whenever her detections allow
her to unambiguously discriminate the state (i.e., when
she measures photons in three different detectors, ensur-
ing the correct state is the one measured in the basis with
only one detector click). When the state discrimination is
ambiguous (measurement in only one or two detectors),
she sends nothing. We assume that Eve’s alignment is
as good as Alice’s and Bob’s (same fringe visibility V ),
giving Eve’s QBER [33]
Qe =
1
2
(
1− V
1 + 4pe/(µtstBSηe)
)
, (8)
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where tBS (ts) is the insertion loss of Eve’s imperfect
beamsplitter (optical switch), ηe is the total detection
efficiency of Bob′ (including its internal losses), and pe is
the detector dark count probability in Bob′. The mutual
information between Alice and Eve is then:
I ′′A:E = RUSD(1−H(Qe)), (9)
where RUSD is the contribution to Bob’s detection rate
when Eve successfully performs the USD attack. The
rate is given by the probability that Eve’s measurement
is unambiguous multiplied by the probability that Bob
registers a measurement in the right basis:
RUSD = pUSD
1
2
(2pd + 1− e−µetstbη), (10)
where pUSD is the probability of an unambiguous mea-
surement by Eve given by the probability of three-
detector click:
pUSD = (1− e−xµtBStsηe/2)(1− e−xµtBStsηe/4)2 (11)
(see also endnote [37]).
In order for Eve to not be detected, she must maintain
the expected rate at Bob:
pUSDattackRUSD + (1− pUSDattack)
1
2
(2pd + 1− e−xµt2sttbη)
=
1
2
(2pd + 1− e−µttbη).
(12)
As x increases, pUSDattack will increase, allowing Eve to per-
form her attack more often. If x is large enough, Eve can
perform the attack on every pulse (pUSDattack = 1) without
reducing the rate, giving her maximum information.
V. PERFORMANCE OF ATTACKS
A. Assumptions
We modeled our attacks using parameters extracted
from experimental runs of the Clavis2 system. For sev-
eral values of channel transmission t we extracted QBER
Q, fringe visibility V , average photon number at Alice’s
output µ, Bob’s detector efficiency η and dark count rate
pd (averaged between Bob’s two detectors). We used the
factory-calibrated value for Bob’s interferometer short-
arm transmission tb. The number of data pulses sent by
Alice was extrapolated based on the number of detections
at Bob, t, µ, tb, η and pd, allowing us to ignore detector
deadtime by giving us a number of pulses for which Bob’s
detectors were sensitive.
Both of our attacks follow the three basic assump-
tions described in Section IV. In the strong attack, Eve
uses lossless lines, perfect efficiency detector with no
dark counts and perfect alignment, and has access to
perfect-efficiency quantum memory and the quantum
non-demolition photon-number measurement. For our
modeling of the realistic attack, we assume commercially
available fiber beamsplitters that can achieve insertion
loss as low as 0.3 dB [38] (in addition to splitting loss),
and optical switches which can achieve insertion loss of
< 1 dB [39, 40]. The best detectors that would currently
be available for Eve are superconducting nanowire detec-
tors, which are commercially available and have shown
both high efficiency (> 90%) and very low dark count
rate (< 100 s−1) [41, 42]. We assume the total detec-
tion efficiency of Bob′ ηe = 80%, to further account for
minor losses in his optical scheme. We measured the
QBER of our Clavis2 system without Eve (for example,
in BB84 at 3.4 dB line loss, it was 1.34%). In both of our
attacks, this measured QBER is used as the minimum
QBER for Bob. We allow Eve to increase the QBER in
the strong attack to a maximum of 8%, which is near the
limit where Clavis2 can (sometimes) extract secure key
[43]. The realistic attack does not cause any increase in
QBER because Eve will block all pulses where she does
not unambiguously determine the state.
Of the three attacks presented in this paper, the first
two require Eve to suppress a certain number of pulses.
This limits the information that Eve can gather because
she has to maintain the rate at Bob by decreasing the
probability of her attack (pUSDattack). In the third attack,
Eve can increase the energy of all pulses, which allows
her to get the most information. We used numerical sim-
ulation to compute the performance of the attacks.
B. Attack on BB84
The fraction of secret key that can be known to Eve
with the attacks is shown in Fig. 10. In the bandwidth
and saturation attacks, Eve must increase µ sufficiently
to compensate for the suppressed pulses before the attack
can be performed without Eve being notice. The band-
width attack on Clavis2 can increase µ by up to a factor
x = 7.3 while suppressing two pulses, more than the re-
quired x = 5 to extract full information in the realistic
attack model. The performance of the saturation attack
is hindered by the large number of pulses suppressed.
Nevertheless, the required x = 6.2 to extract full infor-
mation in the realistic attack model can be achieved since
suppressing four pulses allows x = 7.87. Both attacks are
able to extract full information using the strong attack
model, with the bandwidth attack requiring x = 2.7,
while the saturation attacks requires x = 3.8. The edge-
trigger attack, where no pulses are suppressed, allows Eve
to extract information with a lower µ (starting at x = 3
in the realistic attack model), and can extract full infor-
mation at x ≥ 3.2. The strong attack is able to extract
full information at x = 1.5.
Figure 11 shows the dependence of x on channel loss
for both partial and full information leak in the edge-
trigger attack. The value of µ depends on the channel
loss (µ ≈ t [33]), resulting in attack thresholds that only
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FIG. 10: (Color online) Fraction of secret key leaked to
Eve in the BB84 protocol. The edge-trigger attack,
which can increase µ in all pulses, allows Eve to gain
full information with lower multiplication factor x than
the attacks that require suppression of pulses. At low x
(where the curve stops, marked by the crosses), Eve is
unable to maintain the expected count rate at Bob (in
the realistic attack), or induces too high QBER (in the
strong attack), resulting in her presence being noticed
and the key aborted. When the ratio is 0 (realistic
attack), Eve is able to maintain the rate but cannot
extract sufficient information to overcome privacy
amplification. Channel loss is 3.4 dB and, in the strong
attack model, Eve is restricted to a maximum QBER of
8% to avoid suspicion. This maximum QBER value was
chosen because it is near the limit where Clavis2 can
(sometimes) extract secure key [43].
weakly depend on the channel loss, as seen in Fig. 11.
Note that commercial Clavis2 systems are only able to
extract secure keys up to a certain line loss, limited by
detector dark counts. BB84 protocol is more sensitive
to loss than SARG04. Our system sample was able to
produce secure key with BB84 at up to 6.7 dB line loss.
Beyond this loss, BB84 was never able to extract secure
key and thus there was no key information for Eve to
gain.
While we have analysed the basic BB84 protocol as im-
plemented in Clavis2, analysis of its detector-decoy [44]
and source-decoy [20, 21] variants can be a future study.
In the latter case it is intuitively clear that with a suf-
ficiently high x, Eve can distinguish between different
decoy states.
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FIG. 11: (Color online) Minimum x to obtain partial
and full information on the secret key in the edge-trigger
attack (i.e., with no pulses suppressed) on the BB84
protocol. For the strong (realistic) attack model, Eve is
able to extract partial information when between the
saltire (cross) and circle (square), and full information
above the circle (square). Again, Eve is restricted to a
maximum QBER of 8% to avoid suspicion.
C. Attack on SARG04
In the SARG04 protocol [45], keys are encoded in the
basis instead of in the state. This lowers the sifting factor
to 1/4 (from BB84’s 1/2) but makes the protocol more
robust to PNS attacks. To properly identify the encoded
bit, Eve’s measurement must return the same outcome as
Bob’s measurement. Each photon measured by Eve thus
has a probability 1/4 of giving the desired outcome. The
probability that Eve fails to gain the right information
when measuring n photons is then
En =
(
3
4
)n
. (13)
In addition, because the basis is never revealed in the
analysis, Eve gains no advantage in waiting until sift-
ing to perform her measurement. We extended both the
strong and the realistic attack models to this protocol
using Eve’s modified probability of failure. The results
are shown in Fig. 12.
While SARG04 is more resistant to the PNS attack
than BB84, it’s also less resistant to the USD attack.
This is because the SARG04 protocol performs privacy
amplification based on the photon-number-splitting at-
tack in which, for one measured photon, Eve extracts
only 1/4 of the information. In comparison, Eve could
extract full information in BB84 for one photon mea-
surement using photon-number-splitting attack. How-
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FIG. 12: (Color online) Fraction of secret key leaked to
Eve in the SARG04 protocol. As with BB84, the attack
that does not require Eve to suppress pulses performs
better than the attacks that require pulse suppression.
Once again, the missing points in the curve at low x
(marked by the crosses) occur when Eve is unable to
maintain the expected count rate at Bob (in the
realistic attack), or induces too high QBER (in the
strong attack), resulting in her presence being noticed
and the key aborted. When the ratio is 0 (realistic
attack), Eve is able to maintain the rate but cannot
extract sufficient information to overcome privacy
amplification. Channel loss is 3.4 dB and, in the strong
attack model, Eve is restricted to a maximum QBER of
8% to avoid suspicion.
ever, the information extracted by the USD attack is the
same for both SARG04 and BB84, allowing partial key
extraction at lower x owing to the reduced privacy am-
plification performed by the SARG04 protocol. As with
BB84, the attacks requiring fewer blocked pulses perform
better.
VI. ATTACK ON QUANTUM COIN-TOSSING
Quantum coin tossing (QCT) allows two distrustful
parties (Alice and Bob) that are separated by distance to
agree on a bit value, while providing security guarantees
that are stronger than classically possible. Loss-tolerant
strong QCT protocol was first proposed in [46] and imple-
mented in [47] with the use of an entangled source. The
protocol was slightly modified in [48] to account for noise
in the system, and enabled the implementation of QCT
using a plug-and-play system [24]. The two implemen-
tations [24, 47] expanded the applicability of quantum
information processing beyond QKD. Their results con-
firmed that using today’s technology, QCT can provide a
lower cheating probability than its classical counterpart.
In this section we demonstrate how a deviation of µ from
the ideal value can affect the performance of the QCT
protocol presented in [48]. In order to take into account
all standard experimental imperfections, including chan-
nel noise, multiphoton pulses, losses and dark counts,
Pappa et al. introduced an honest abort probability H,
which is the probability that the protocol is unsuccessful
when both parties are honest. For a desirable value of
H, the two players can agree on the value of the protocol
parameters, namely the number of protocol rounds K,
the mean photon number µ and the state coefficient y of
the (rotated) Bell states used by the protocol [24].
Alice’s cheating probability only depends on the coef-
ficient y of the quantum states, therefore a deviation of
the mean photon number will not improve her strategy.
However, Bob’s cheating probability is a function of µ
and can be upper-bounded [24, 48]
pBcheat ≤
4∑
i=1
P (Ai)P (cheat|Ai) + [1−
4∑
i=1
P (Ai)]. (14)
Here, P (Ai) (for i = 1, . . . , 4) is the probability of the
four possible events where Bob receives at most one two-
photon pulse in the K protocol rounds, and P (cheat|Ai)
is the maximum cheating probability given that event Ai
occurred. For the remaining events, we consider that the
cheating probability is 1 (see the supplementary material
of [24] for a more detailed explanation).
We use the data obtained from the plug-and-play im-
plementation of QCT over 15 km of optical fiber using
Clavis2 [24], to demonstrate how a malicious Bob, hav-
ing the ability to increase µ by a factor x without be-
ing detected, can increase his cheating probability. In
Fig. 13, we show the effect of the three attacks presented
in this paper, on Bob’s cheating probability in compar-
ison with the ideal case where µ does not deviate from
its ideal value (in this case µ = 0.0019) [49]. Using the
bandwidth attack for the two-pulse blocking case, the
mean photon number increases to 7.3µ while the proto-
col rounds decrease to K/3. For the saturation attack
with four-pulse blocking, we have mean photon number
7.87µ and rounds K/5. Finally, for the edge-triggered
attack we have used x = 10 while keeping the number of
protocol rounds the same (i.e., no pulses suppressed), re-
sulting in unity Bob’s cheating probability. We note that
our modeling here upper-bounds Bob’s cheating proba-
bility, considering that he has perfect equipment, controls
the losses of the channel, and also has the ability to per-
form quantum non-demolition measurements.
We observe that, if Bob uses any of the three attacks
to increase the mean photon number, and is not detected
by Alice’s pulse-energy-monitoring system, then there is
no provable quantum advantage for coin tossing. This
means that, similar to QKD, QCT is also vulnerable
against the inability to maintain a constant mean photon
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FIG. 13: (Color online) Bob’s cheating probability
versus honest abort probability in the coin-tossing
protocol. The plot shows limits for the classical
coin-tossing and QCT (for 15 km and µ = 0.0019 [24]),
as well as limits for the three attacks on QCT. We
observe that all three Bob’s attacks beat the classical
limit, and QCT can therefore provide no provable
advantage. Also plotted is factor x required to reduce
security of QCT to that of its classical counterpart.
number. In Fig. 13, we also show how much manipulation
of µ is required from a quantum Bob in order to increase
his cheating probability to the classical limit. For exam-
ple, for honest abort probability 0.014, if Bob is able to
increase µ by x = 1.389 from the ideal value of 0.0019,
then his cheating probability becomes the same as the
classical cheating probability. Equivalently, this means
that for this specific honest abort probability, Alice needs
to have a measurement precision of 38.9% on the value
of µ, if she wants to make her protocol at least as se-
cure as its classical counterpart. So, even if measures are
taken to prevent an adversary from manipulating µ, lim-
ited experimental precision for setting the exact security
parameters inherently affects the protocol performance,
and can even make it insecure.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
Although the implemented strategy of the pulse-
energy-monitoring module is generally correct, the tech-
nical realization should be revised dramatically in order
to be efficient against arbitrary Trojan-horse attacks. It
requires changes in many parts of the circuit: the front-
end amplifier, the integrator and the alarm detector.
The negative saturation of the transimpedance ampli-
fier OPA380 can be prevented by pulling down its output
by a 2 kΩ resistor to the −5 V power supply, as advised
in the datasheet of the opamp [28]. Nevertheless, the
amplifier bandwidth choice, which has been made on a
specification considering limited classes of attacks, is not
sufficient for the accurate metering of the calibrated sig-
nal (second) pulse when Eve can transfer optical energy
from the first pulse to the second one. To obtain pre-
cision of, say, 10%, the amplifier output after the first
pulse needs to decay to 5% of its maximum value, since
the first pulse is about twice as large as the second pulse.
It limits the time constant of an amplifier by the value of
50 ns/(−ln(0.05)) = 16.7 ns, which corresponds to band-
width of at least 9.5 MHz (assuming amplifier’s frequency
response equivalent to an RC-filter). Hence, the front-
end transimpedance amplifier should be remodeled to en-
hance the bandwidth.
At the moment, the integrator circuit functions more
like a peak detector than an ideal integrator. Square-law
dependence of the FET1 source current on the gate volt-
age results in non-linearity. It appears that the circuit
output is more sensitive to a higher level of the input
signal, which is typical for peak-detecting. This way, the
circuit actually measures the pulse peak intensity rather
than the pulse energy. For proper implementation, the
integrator should be built in such a way that the capaci-
tor is charged by current linearly depending on the input
voltage.
The edge-triggered alarm generation by means of a
monostable is not needed in this circuit at all. Instead, a
simple level triggering can be used. Actually, there is no
risk of the FPGA missing a too-short electrical pulse at
the output of the comparator, because the voltage at C
cannot rise until it is reset by the FPGA through FET2.
Hence, the monostable can be simply excluded, with pos-
sibly slightly delaying resetting the integrator capacitor
C to ensure a minimum time to keep the comparator
output in a low logic-level state.
Implementing a precise high-speed analog integrator
could be challenging. Alternatively the amplifier signal
could be digitized with a fast analog-to-digital converter,
and the rest of processing done numerically in the FPGA.
The continuous detector is not needed for security if
the pulse-energy-monitoring detector is properly imple-
mented. ID Quantique has been informed about our re-
sults prior to this publication, and is developing counter-
measures for their affected QKD system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we point out the risk to security that
exists when the communicating parties do not have an
exact estimate of the system’s security parameters (µ
in this case). We also discuss technical measures that
should allow to calibrate µ with an acceptable precision
and restore security. Let us remark however that ensur-
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ing an accurate knowledge of the security parameters at
the time of system installation may not be sufficient. The
calibration of equipment may be lost later in the system
lifetime either because of a laser-damage attack by Eve
[50], or because the equipment parameters drift beyond
their initial specifications as electronic components age
and begin to fail. Tackling this problem is an open ques-
tion. One possible way to achieve a better understanding
is to examine implementation details, no matter how lit-
tle, more closely than has been done before.
This work also highlights the limitations of closed se-
curity standards developed inside a manufacturing com-
pany. Although the company in this case went above and
beyond everyone else’s prior research in this field in or-
der to secure their commercial system (as mentioned in
Sec. II C), this was not sufficient. In this case, as well as
in numerous other instances [12–16, 19, 31, 43, 51], an
independent research team uncovered security problems
that the original developers of the systems missed. To ad-
dress this situation, we suggest a two-fold solution. First,
open standards on secure implementation and testing of
QKD should be developed in a collaboration between the
research community and industry. This process is already
taking place [52], but can be intensified in the security
specifications aspect. Second, practice shows that inde-
pendent researchers are usually better at finding security
problems than the developers. We therefore think that
testing for both unexpected security problems, and for
standards compliance, should be led by independent se-
curity certification labs.
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